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Imagining the Future of Victims’ Rights in Canada: 





The role of victims of crime in common law jurisdictions has 
significantly changed over the last few decades from that of simple 
bystanders and witnesses for the Crown—if needed—to more present and 
active participants in the criminal justice process.  Despite this general 
trend towards increased participation, victim-related policies have 
evolved very differently in the different common law jurisdictions. 
The following piece examines the evolution of victims’ rights in Canada 
and compares their development to those within other jurisdictions, 
particularly in England, Wales, and the United States.  It argues that the 
evolution of several victims’ rights1 has been incremental, generally 
slower and more limited in Canada as compared to other common law 
jurisdictions, namely England and Wales and the United States.  Hence, 
it highlights the limitations of Canadian initiatives with regards to 
victims’ rights and brings forward some of the different initiatives and 
their implementation in these other jurisdictions as possible measures to 




In recent years, policies in common law jurisdictions have increasingly 
brought victims into the foreground through the development of policies that 
recognize a wide range of rights for victims of crime within the criminal justice 
process.2  
                                                                                                                                          
∗   Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, McGill University.  The author is most grateful to 
Professor Paul Cassell for invaluable insight related to the American perspective. 
1   The term “rights” is used throughout this paper for convenience.  However, it is important 
to note that victims in Canada do not have real rights with remedies; therefore, it may not be 
considered accurate terminology.  
2   Many have criticized the terminology of ‘rights’ employed, suggesting that the term should 
be reserved for enforceable rights with legal remedies.  For pragmatic purposes, the term ‘rights’ 
throughout this thesis is used in Fenwick’s broader sense and includes entitlements, obligations, and 
expectations within policies that are not necessarily legally enforceable.  See Helen Fenwick, 
Procedural ‘Rights’ of Victims of Crime: Public or Private Ordering of the Criminal Justice 
Process?, 60 MOD. L. REV. 317, 318 (1997). 
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These rights have been divided into two categories, namely service and 
procedural rights.3  Service rights are defined as initiatives that aim to provide 
victims with better treatment and better experiences in the criminal justice system.  
They include, for example, rights to information/notification about important court 
dates and the progress of their case, assistance for vulnerable victims, and 
compensation.4  Procedural rights, on the other hand, are more controversial within 
the adversarial context since they provide victims with a more participatory role in 
the decision-making process.  They include opportunities for the victims to provide 
information, and sometimes their views and opinions, to criminal justice agencies 
and courts on key criminal justice decisions relating to prosecution, bail/custody, 
sentence, parole release, and licence decisions, largely by submitting ‘victim 
impact/personal’ statements or through consultation with prosecutors.  
In Canada, the increased interest in victims’ rights can be attributed to a 
number of different factors and situations.  Contrary to some of the victims’ 
movements in other jurisdictions, the development of victims’ rights in Canada 
was mainly the result of government responses to different international influences 
rather than a response to an organized movement or organization in its domestic 
socio-political environment,5 which has been the case in the United States and, to 
some extent, in England and Wales.6  Similarly, to other countries, Canada was a 
signatory of the United Nations’ Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for 
Victims of Crime7 and its policies were influenced by the increasing criticisms of 
the adversarial model’s shortcomings for victims of crime.  Indeed, one of the 
main rationales behind victim involvement relied notably on the idea that victims 
were ignored and excluded from the criminal justice process for too long and, as a 
result, suffered secondary victimization8 and failed to collaborate with the system.  
                                                                                                                                          
3   ANDREW ASHWORTH & MIKE REDMAYNE, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS 52 (4th ed. 2010).  This 
classification will be used for the purposes of this thesis.  
4   Andrew Sanders, Victim Participation in an Exclusionary Criminal Justice System, in NEW 
VISIONS OF CRIME VICTIMS 197, 213–15 (Carolyn Hoyle & Richard Young eds., 2002).  
5   It is important to note that for certain policies related to victims of sexual assault, feminist 
perspectives were influential at a domestic level in Canada.  See, e.g., R. v. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 
S.C.R. 330, 335–36 (Can.) (the concurring judgment of Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in particular uses 
feminist views to denounce myths and stereotypes about sexual assault victims); R. v. Seaboyer; R. v. 
Gayme, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 (Can.) (the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) upheld the constitutionality 
of section 277 of the Criminal Code, which prevents a complainant’s sexual reputation from being 
submitted as trial evidence based on now widely accepted feminist reasoning). 
6   A comparative analysis of the ‘movements’ within these two jurisdictions has been 
examined in further detail elsewhere.  See Marie Manikis, Rhetoric or Reality?: Victims’ 
Enforcement Mechanisms in England and Wales and the United States (Jan 1, 2014) (unpublished 
D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford) (on file with the University of Oxford Faculty of Law). 
7   Declaration on Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, G.A. 
Res. 40/34, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 96th Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 214, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (Nov. 29, 
1985) [hereinafter United Nations Declaration]. 
8   The concept of secondary victimization is based on the notion that in addition to the harm 
felt from the crime itself, victims also suffer from a second form of harm as a result of their exclusion 
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In order to fulfill its undertakings under the United Nations Declaration, to 
minimize secondary victimization, and to increase victim collaboration with the 
criminal justice system, the Canadian federal government and the various 
provinces have enacted instruments framed as basic principles and guidelines for 
developing victim-related policies meant to address these issues.  It is worth noting 
that in Canada, due to the constitutionally recognized separation of powers, victim-
related policies fall within dual jurisdictions.  More specifically, questions relating 
to the administration of the criminal justice process are a provincial matter, while 
criminal law is a federal matter.  
As a way to incorporate their international commitments into domestic policy, 
the federal, provincial, and territorial ministers of justice endorsed the 1988 
Canadian Statement of Basic Principles, which was later replaced by the Canadian 
Statement of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime 2003.  These basic 
principles were essentially broad and vague, and were meant to “guide the 
development of policies, programs and legislation related to victims of crime.”9  
Further, all provinces and territories, except for Yukon and Nunavut, have also 
enacted their own legislation that lists a number of victims’ “rights,” ranging from 
victims’ services to greater participation in criminal proceedings.10  In addition, 
like most common law jurisdictions, Canada has recognized victim participation in 
sentencing through a legislative victim impact statements scheme in the Criminal 
Code, which will be explored in greater depth below.  Recently, the Canadian 
government introduced legislative reform in the Canadian Victims’ Bill of Rights 
(Bill C-32),11 (hereinafter VBR) but, as will be highlighted below, this reform is 
                                                                                                                                          
from the criminal process.  Research on secondary victimization was influential in most jurisdictions.  
See, e.g., Dean G. Kilpatrick & Randy K. Otto, Constitutionally Guaranteed Participation in 
Criminal Proceedings for Victims: Potential Effects on Psychological Functioning, 34 WAYNE L. 
REV. 7, 7–8 (1987). 
9   DEP’T OF JUSTICE CAN., CANADIAN STATEMENT OF BASIC PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE FOR 
VICTIMS OF CRIME, 2003 (2003). 
10  The first province to enact a victims’ act was Manitoba in 1986 and it was aimed at 
rebalancing the rights of victims with the accused’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Part I of 
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.)) rights. See The 
Justice for Victims of Crime Act, S.M. 1986, c 28 (Can.).  A decade later, in 1995, Ontario’s 
Conservative government, inspired by the same rationales as Manitoba, introduced Ontario’s 
Victims’ Bill of Rights, S.O. 1995, c 6, art 2(1) (Can.).  The bill was premised on victims as 
consumers of the criminal justice system with special needs that had to be fulfilled.  For more details, 
see KENT ROACH, DUE PROCESS AND VICTIMS’ RIGHTS: THE NEW LAW AND POLITICS OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 278 (1999) [hereinafter ROACH, DUE PROCESS AND VICTIMS’ RIGHTS]; Kent Roach, Crime 
Victims and Substantive Criminal Law, in TOWARDS A CLEAR AND JUST CRIMINAL LAW: A CRIMINAL 
REPORTS FORUM 219 (Don Stuart et al. eds., 1999). 
11  At the time of drafting this piece, there was a proposed Victims’ Bill of Rights in the 
Canadian Parliament, introduced by the federal government, which would legislate victims’ rights for 
the first time in federal legislation: Bill C-32, An Act to Enact the Canadian Victims Bill of Rights 
and to Amend Certain Acts, 2nd Sess. 41st Parl., 2014, cl 62-63 (first reading April 3, 2014) 
[hereinafter Victim Bill] (This proposed Bill was introduced in Parliament in April 2014 and is still at 
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limited in a number of areas related to victims’ rights and ultimately seems to 
create more confusion and raise questions, rather than provide answers and 
evidence-based solutions. 
This article analyzes the Canadian context—including its recent developments 
and limitations—and explores the possible trajectories Canada can take in light of 
experiences and findings in other common law jurisdictions.12  Due to space and 
time constraints, this analysis addresses specific areas that merit further 
development in the victims’ literature, including the implementation of information 
rights, the possible involvement of victims in prosecutorial decisions, victim 
participation in sentencing, and remedies for rights violations.  
 
II. VICTIMS AND SERVICE RIGHTS 
 
In Canada, a number of different victims’ service rights are recognized within 
the provinces, including government compensation, information, and 
witness/victim testimonial accommodations within courthouses to facilitate the 
victim’s experience in the criminal justice system.  The federal government also 
has some jurisdiction related to the provision of victims’ services, etc., within its 
remit of federally based offenses.13  The following section addresses more 
specifically the current situation of information rights in Canada since it is 
arguably one of the most important rights identified by victims. 
 
A. The Right to Information 
 
Research suggests that being kept informed about the process is one of the 
most important needs identified by victims of crime.14  In Canada, the 
indispensability of this right for victims cannot be overstated.15  Support for this 
claim can be found in various Canadian pilot projects that have been conducted by 
the Department of Justice Canada.  These results have been summarized as 
follows: “Completing a statement does not, by itself, make the victims feel better 
about how the system is handling their case.  They want to be informed about the 
                                                                                                                                          
its first reading at the time this piece was drafted).  It became law at the moment of final edits without 
changes to its initial proposal.  See Canadian Victims Bill of Rights S.C. 2015, c 13, s 2 (Can.).  
12  Due to time and space constraints, the present article focuses on the experience in England, 
Wales, and the American jurisdictions that have the most comprehensive and developed models of 
victims’ rights.  
13  Although criminal law and the creation of criminal offenses is a federal power in Canada, 
provinces are responsible for the administration of justice, including criminal courts.  However, for 
certain specific federal crimes, including terrorism, tax-related, and drug offenses, the administration 
is also handled by the federal jurisdiction.  These crimes, however, are quite limited.  
14  Jo-Anne Wemmers, Victims in the Dutch Criminal Justice System: The Effects of Treatment 
on Victims’ Attitudes and Compliance, 3 INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 323, 338 (1995). 
15  ALLAN MANSON ET AL., Victim Participation in the Sentencing Process, in SENTENCING AND 
PENAL POLICY IN CANADA: CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY 251 (2d ed. 2008). 
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progress of their case and they want information on how the criminal justice 
system operates” (emphasis added).16 
In addition, evidence has shown that when victims are left in the dark and 
remain uninformed about the developments in their case, secondary victimization 
often occurs.  Indeed, victims who are the most affected by the offense may 
experience a level of stress similar to that caused by the offense itself when they 
are not informed about the process.17  Victims who are not fully informed as to 
what and why developments are occurring at all stages of the criminal process, 
both before and after the trial, may experience this form of stress, which arguably 
diminishes their psychological well-being and increases the period needed for 
psychological recovery.18  A Canadian study focusing on sexual assault victims 
concluded that “[b]eing empowered with knowledge about the proceedings—even 
when this is by necessity limited—would go a long way to hasten the healing 
process for women who have been sexually assaulted.”19 
Currently in Canada, the various Victims of Crime Acts are very disparate20 
and do not clearly classify and define the extent of information that must be 
provided to victims.  Further, the Acts remain vague and do not provide a clear 
division of duties between the agencies that are meant to implement them.  
Additionally, and most importantly, when agencies fail to provide information to 
victims, most statutes do not provide a mechanism for accountability and redress.  
The following paragraphs analyze the various provincial statutes and argue that 
certain measures can be taken to facilitate compliance and understanding for the 
agencies and the victims involved in the criminal process. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
16  Carolina Giliberti, Evaluation of Victim Impact Statement Projects in Canada: A Summary 
of the Findings, in VICTIMS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LEGAL PROTECTION, RESTITUTION AND SUPPORT 
703, 717 (Gunther Kaiser et al. eds., 1991). 
17  See Fenwick, supra note 2, at 321. 
18  See CANADIAN FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL TASK FORCE ON JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME 
REPORT, 57 (1983); TIM NEWBURN & SUSAN MERRY, KEEPING IN TOUCH: POLICE-VICTIM 
COMMUNICATION IN TWO AREAS (1990); JOANNA SHAPLAND, JON WILMORE & PETER DUFF, VICTIMS 
IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 190–91 (A. E. Bottoms ed., 1985).  
19  Jeffrey Griffiths, Toronto Police Service, Review of the Investigation of Sexual Assaults 59 
(1999). 
20  See, e.g., ROACH, DUE PROCESS AND VICTIMS’ RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 285–87 (Roach 
suggests that significant differences existed between Manitoba’s bill and Ontario’s.  While Manitoba 
contemplated alternatives to criminal prosecutions by stating that victims should receive information 
about crime prevention, mediation, and information reconciliation procedures, the Ontario model 
focused primarily on providing information about criminal investigations and prosecutions.  Further, 
important disparities exist between the various provincial bills regarding victim impact statements 
and the forms victims can complete.).  See also Julian V. Roberts & Marie Manikis, Victim Impact 
Statements at Sentencing: The Relevance of Ancillary Harm, 15 CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2010). 
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1. 1. Defining and Redefining the Duty to Inform 
 
i. Classifying and Defining the Extent of the Duty to Inform  
 
To clarify the broad notion of informing victims about the progress of their 
case, Fenwick proposes classifying information rights into two separate categories: 
the right to factual information and the right to be informed of informal aspects.21 
The former category includes information related to cautioning, charging, remand, 
bail and its conditions, court hearings, sentence appeals, and release.  The informal 
aspects, on the other hand, include information on elements such as the system of 
charge or plea-bargaining, as well as explanations and the reasoning behind the 
key decisions that are made in cases.  For instance, this consists of explaining to 
victims the decisions made to prosecute or not, the choice behind certain charges, 
and the outcome of final hearings and sentences.  
The various provincial victims’ legislation mainly suggest that victims should 
receive factual information and, in general, do not require agencies to provide 
victims with further explanations about the decisions that are made throughout the 
process.22  For example, in British Columbia, the Victims of Crime Act23 classifies 
information into three categories.  The first category of information includes 
general information about the criminal justice system.  The second category of 
information refers to information victims are entitled to receive about their specific 
case, including the status of the investigation, the outcomes of the case, and 
notifications of court appearances.  The third category of information includes 
information regarding the accused in custody and suggests that the Minister must 
provide this information to the victim if the victim’s interests outweigh the privacy 
interest of the accused/offender.  In other provinces, however, the information 
provisions are much more general and describe a minimum amount of general 
information that victims, in principle, should be entitled to receive.24  
                                                                                                                                          
21  Helen Fenwick, Rights of Victims in the Criminal Justice System: Rhetoric or Reality?, 
CRIM. L. REV. 843, 846–47 (1995). 
22  Exceptionally, section 2(1)2v of Ontario’s Victims’ Bill of Rights, S.O. 1995, c 6, art 2(1) 
(Can. Ont.), requires that victims be provided with some explanations by stating that information 
should be provided on “the charges laid with respect to the crime and, if no charges are laid, the 
reasons why no charges are laid.”  
23  Victims of Crime Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c 478, ss 5, 6, 7 (Can. B.C.). 
24  Prince Edward Island’s Victims of Crime Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988 c V-3.1, s 2 (Can.), simply 
states that “victims should be informed about the progress of the investigation and prosecution of the 
offence, court procedures, the role of the victim in court proceedings and the ultimate disposition of 
proceedings.”  There is no information required about receiving information on the various stages of 
the process or important prosecutorial decisions.  In Nova Scotia, the Victims’ Rights and Services 
Act’s information provisions are quite general and, among other requirements, suggest that victims 
have the right to be informed of the name of the accused. See Victims’ Rights and Services Act, 
S.N.S. 1989, c 14, s 3(2)(a)(i) (Can.). 
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Manitoba remains the exception with its comprehensive Victims’ Bill of 
Rights;25 it provides information to victims and describes in detail their 
entitlements at the various stages of the criminal justice process, including the 
investigation of the offense, the prosecution, the court process, and correctional 
services.  This Bill also lists a number of rights that victims should expect from the 
system, namely how to obtain dates, times, and places of proceedings, their right to 
apply for witness protection measures, and their right to file and obtain assistance 
in completing a victim impact statement. 
Further, since victims often misunderstand the outcomes and implications of 
certain professional and court decisions, particularly regarding sentencing, jury 
acquittals, and implications of early release decisions, explanatory information is 
also an important need victims have.  In other words, victims seek explanations 
about important decisions that are made in ‘their’ cases.  Currently, most 
legislation and Policy Manuals that guide criminal justice professionals do not 
clearly specify the extent of information that must be provided to victims.  Instead, 
they seem to mainly emphasize the provision of general information about the 
system and certain case-specific decisions, without expressly requiring that 
explanations be provided to victims.  The various acts should therefore require, at 
least to victims of more serious offenses, the disclosure of a “higher level”26 of 
information; namely, the right to be offered explanations for decisions and the 
outcome of the process. Where this is required, it is essential that the legislation 
also identify who is responsible for meeting this disclosure requirement, as 
otherwise there will inevitably be problems in getting any one service provider to 
accept responsibility for this task.  
Another important element that is not clearly specified in the statutes is the 
process victims must follow to exercise their right to information.  To facilitate 
compliance, it is crucial that provisions specify whether the responsible agency 
should automatically provide information to victims or whether the information 
should be provided upon the victim’s request.  In some provinces, including 
British Columbia and Manitoba, the statutes distinguish between the information 
that should be requested by the victim and the information that must be provided 
by agencies without prior request.27 Most statutes, however, do not specify whether 
victims must request the information, which can undoubtedly be confusing for 
victims and the responsible agencies.  Other formulations also suffer from 
                                                                                                                                          
25  Victims’ Bill of Rights, C.C.S.M. 1998, c V55 (Can.). 
26  See Fenwick, supra note 2, at 322. 
27  Victims’ Bill of Rights, C.C.S.M. 1998, c V55, ss 7, 11, 12 (Can. Man.). In British 
Columbia, the Victims of Crime Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c 478, ss 5, 6, 7 (Can.), divides the information 
entitlements into three categories: information that must be offered, information that must be given 
on request, and information that will be given in appropriate circumstances. In New Brunswick, the 
Victims Services Act, S.N.B. 1987, c V-2.1 (Can.), states a wide range of principles, including 
information, without specifying whether victims should request it.  However, with regard to 
procedures of the Mental Disorder Review Board, it is clearly stated that victims should make a 
request in writing if they wish to receive any information. Id. 
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ambiguity and need to be made clearer.  For instance, the terms “should have 
access,”28 “should be given information,”29 and “should be made available”30 often 
create much confusion about whether victims must actually request the information 
or whether they can expect to receive it from the various agencies automatically.  
Finally, in some jurisdictions, the term “rights” is specifically used to describe 
victims’ entitlements, but these statutes fail to specify whether they are negative or 
positive rights.31  
 
ii. Dividing and Specifying Agencies’ Duty to Inform 
 
Apart from Manitoba’s Victims’ Bill of Rights,32 which specifies the agency 
responsible for informing victims at all stages of the proceedings, none of the 
provincial statutes, nor the Canadian Statement of Basic Principles of Justice for 
Victims of Crime, 2003 or the Canadian Victims’ Bill of Rights, clearly designate 
the specific criminal justice agency in charge of fulfilling these specific 
informational duties.  An example of this ambiguity can be found in the Victims of 
Crime Act in Alberta which states that the victim “is to be provided with 
information by the person or agency that has the information with respect to the 
case.”33  Hence, to facilitate compliance, ambiguous terms like “justice system 
personnel”34 or statutes that do not provide any specifications35 must be avoided.  
Statutes relating to victims’ rights should be more precise and should clearly 
designate at each stage of the process the agency responsible for performing this 
duty.  As highlighted by Shapland, who has undertaken research on compliance 
related to victims in England and Wales: “It is only by clearly assigning 
responsibility to each agency for those aspects of criminal justice through which it 
                                                                                                                                          
28  Victims’ Bill of Rights, S.O. 1995, c 6, s 2(1)(2) (Can.). 
29  Victims Services Act, S.N.B. 1987, c V-2.1, s 7 (Can.); DEP’T OF JUSTICE CAN., supra note 
9.  
30  Victims of Crime Service Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c V-5, s 7 (Can. Nfld.). 
31  Victims’ Rights and Services Act, S.N.S. 1989, c 14, s 3(2)(a) (Can. N.S.); An Act 
Respecting Assistance for Victims of Crime, R.S.Q. 1988, c A-13.2, s 4 (Can. Que.). 
32  The Victims’ Bill of Rights, C.C.S.M. 1998, c V55 (Can. Man.). 
33  Victims of Crime Act, R.S.A. 2000, c V-3, s 4(1) (Can. Alta.). 
34  Victims of Crime Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c 478, ss 5, 6 (Can. B.C.). 
35  For example, in Quebec, the Act Respecting Assistance for Victims of Crime, R.S.Q. 1988, 
c. A-13.2 (Can. Que.), does not mention at all any agencies or personnel in charge of providing 
information rights to victims.  The Newfoundland Victims of Crime Services Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. 
V-5 (Can. Nfld.), also provides victims with some vague general rights to information without 
mentioning who or which agency should be in charge of carrying out these obligations.  Further, in 
the Northwest Territories, instead of designating agencies, the Victims of Crime Act, R.S.N.W.T. 
1988, c.9, s.5(c) (Can. N.W.T.), suggests that the Victims Assistance Committee should “promote . . . 
the availability of information to a victim” (emphasis added).  
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has any dealings with victims that it will be possible to identify its tasks and its 
necessary budget lines.”36 
It is worth noting that most statutes are complemented by conduct manuals, 
like the Crown Counsel Policy Manuals, that specify prosecutors’ various duties, 
but also include a number of shortcomings.  For instance, the British Columbia 
Victims of Crime Act is complemented by the British Columbia Crown Counsel 
Policy Manual, which suggests that the Crown should be responsible for providing 
case-specific information (the second category of information under the Victims of 
Crime Act).37 Further, police “are designated as having the primary responsibility 
under [section] 5 of the Victims of Crime Act,”38 which consists of general 
information (the first category of information under the Victims of Crime Act), but 
suggests that “[i]f aware that a victim has not been offered the required 
information, Crown Counsel or support staff will provide the standard written 
information prepared by the Ministry of Attorney General for that purpose.”39  
Despite the Crown Policy, these specifications can be quite confusing for service 
providers that end up having subsidiary duties in cases where the designated 
agency does not comply with its duties.  Further, in Ontario, the Crown Policy 
Manual is also vague as to the Crown’s informational duties towards victims and 
basically suggests that the Crown should promote victims’ general understanding 
of the criminal justice structure and the victim’s role within it.  Even in the most 
severe crime cases, the Crown is instructed to inform victims in a timely fashion 
on matters that potentially affect their security and are significant to the case.  
These instructions can be difficult to interpret due to their vagueness and lack of 
specificity.  
Further, in Alberta, following a public debate and discussions among the 
various agencies, the Government adopted the Victims of Crime Protocol: What 
Victims Can Expect from the Criminal System, which clarifies victims’ 
expectations throughout the various stages of the process.  Despite its clarity on 
certain issues, the duties among agencies are not clearly delineated and the 
Protocol suggests that the Crown can ask the police, victim service, or correctional 
services to help it give information to victims without specifying more clearly the 
division of duties between each agency.  An initial separation of the various 
informational duties would help determine when and at what stage each agency 
would be most effectively situated to inform victims.  A uniform document that 
describes each agency’s role in informing victims at every stage of proceedings 
would be a laudable measure to achieve greater compliance, reduce confusion 
                                                                                                                                          
36  Joanna Shapland, Victims and Criminal Justice: Creating Responsible Criminal Justice 
Agencies, in INTEGRATING A VICTIM PERSPECTIVE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 154 (Adam Crawford & Jo 
Goodey eds., 2000). 
37  BRITISH COLUMBIA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE BRANCH, MINISTRY OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, CROWN 
COUNSEL POLICY MANUAL VIC 1, VICTIMS OF CRIME (2003). 
38  Id. at 2. 
39  Id. 
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among the various agencies, and help to meet victims’ expectations.  It would also 
increase accountability and expose cases of non-compliance, as victims would be 
able to identify the various agencies in breach of their obligations. 
Other common law jurisdictions illustrate that it is possible to establish a clear 
division of duties that can indeed facilitate the understanding and implementation 
of these duties.  For instance, research suggests that since the enactment of the first 
Code of Practice for Victims of Crime in England and Wales in 2006 (and later 
reformed in 2013), a clear division of duties has been made which reduces the 
confusion among the various agencies that existed under the previous Victims’ 
Charters.40 Prior to the inception of the Code of Practice, these duties were not 
divided in such detail and were considered unclear.  For instance, studies on the 
‘One Stop Shop’41 illustrate that under the 1996 Charter, it was unclear whether it 
was the role of the police or the prosecution to inform victims.42 To facilitate 
compliance, the Code of Practice replaced the previous charters and listed the 
various duties of each agency.  Similarly, American jurisdictions like the state of 
Arizona have enacted comprehensive Bills of Rights, which specify whether the 
courts, the prosecutor, or the law enforcement agency are responsible for 
informing victims at certain stages of the process.43 Manitoba’s statute has also 
followed this path and has specifically divided the informational duties between 
the agencies at each stage of proceedings,44 but this remains the exception in 
Canada. 
Clarification and specificity would not only facilitate compliance and promote 
the understanding of the responsible agency’s role, but would also benefit victims, 
particularly in jurisdictions that require them to request information and services 
from these agencies.45 Thus, victims should be able to know whether they will 
automatically be informed about various elements of the process, or whether they 
need to request the information from particular agencies.  
                                                                                                                                          
40  See, e.g., Manikis, supra note 6; Marie Manikis, A Comparative Overview of Victims’ 
Rights, Enforcement Mechanisms, and Redress in England and Wales and the American Federal 
Jurisdiction, 6 VICTIMS CRIME RES. DIG. 36 (2013). 
41  ‘One-stop shops’ were information centers, where the police would collate and 
communicate information to victims about the progress of ‘their case’—information about the 
charges, trial, outcome of proceedings, and sentences, and help them to complete their personal 
statements—under the 1996 Charter. 
42  CAROLYN HOYLE ET AL., HOME OFFICE RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT AND STATISTICS 
DIRECTORATE, EVALUATION OF THE ‘ONE STOP SHOP’ AND VICTIM PILOT STATEMENT PROJECTS 
(1998). 
43  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4401–13-4440 (2000). 
44  Victims’ Bill of Rights, C.C.S.M. 1998, c V55 (Can. Man.).  The duty to inform is divided 
between the law enforcement agency, the prosecutor, the department of justice in charge of courts, 
and correctional services. 
45  See, e.g., Victims of Crime Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c 478 (Can. B.C.); Quebec’s Act 
Respecting Assistance for Victims of Crime, R.S.Q. 1988, c A-13.2, s 4(2), 5 (Can.) (requiring 
victims to request information on the progress and final disposition of the case as well as the police 
investigation); Victims’ Bill of Rights, S.O. 1995, c 6, s 3 (Can. Ont.). 
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In brief, the recognition of victims’ informational needs entails, among other 
measures, the creation of clear and detailed legislative and regulatory instruments 
that facilitate and encourage understanding, recognition, and compliance by the 
agencies responsible for informing victims.  These agencies mainly include the 
police, prosecutors, victim services, and correctional facilities, and should be 
clearly identified at every stage of the process.  Further, to facilitate compliance, 
the various duties among these agencies must be clearly defined and assigned to a 
particular agency according to each stage of the process.  
The recent VBR had the potential of constructing a federal model of victims’ 
service rights, including information rights that would provide the needed clarity 
on these various fronts.  In light of the analysis above, a possible way forward in 
Canada—supported by evidence of good practice in other jurisdictions—would be 
either to create more detailed and clear legislation or to have an accompanying 
guideline to this legislation with more detailed and comprehensive obligations 
regarding the different service rights, particularly the right to information.  Indeed, 
changes that have proven to be useful in the 2006 and 2013 Code of Practice for 
Victims of Crime in England and Wales would be beneficial not only for federal 
services, but also for the rest of the provinces.  To date, however, contrary to 
Manitoba’s more comprehensive approach, the proposed federal bill remains quite 
vague and does not specifically define the extent and limitations of this right to 
information or divide the duties between the responsible service agencies.  Further 
clarifications in this respect is warranted.  
 
III. PROCEDURAL RIGHTS: A MORE ACTIVE ROLE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME? 
 
A. Victim Participation in Sentencing 
 
In most common law jurisdictions, victim participation in sentencing has been 
recognized through the use of victim impact statements (VIS’s) or victim personal 
statements.  This has also been the case in Canada, where this prominent feature of 
sentencing was added to the Criminal Code of Canada.46  Indeed, criminal justice 
participants in Canada accepted its incorporation within legislation in 1988 much 
quicker than in other jurisdictions.47  Arguably, part of the explanation for this lies 
in the positive empirical data that revealed early on that VIS’s are generally 
considered useful in assessing harm and enabling judges to reach more 
                                                                                                                                          
46  See Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, s 722 (Can.) [hereinafter Criminal 
Code]. 
47  For instance, in England and Wales, the victim personal statement scheme was rolled out 
nationally in 2001, but the Court of Appeals has only recently provided guidelines and recognition to 
this regime.  See, e.g., R. v. Perkins, [2013] EWCA (Crim) 323 (U.K.).  This has recently been 
included in the amended Practice Direction issued in October 2013 (amended December 2013) by the 
Lord Chief Justice.  The Practice Direction, which also reflects the provisions of the Victims’ Code 
of Practice, is set out in the Criminal Procedure Directions.  
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proportionate sentences.48 Further, studies have also shown that these statements 
can also be beneficial and therapeutic for a number of victims that choose to 
complete them.  These findings reveal that victims who chose to complete these 
statements were more satisfied with the criminal justice process.49 
Despite this recognition, some problems remain.  For instance, sentencing 
judges have highlighted the lack of clarity that these legislative provisions provide.  
As they are currently worded, the weight to give these statements and the way in 
which a statement is meant to be considered remain opaque.50  Hence, it is an area 
of sentencing for which clear legislation or appellate court guidance would be 
needed, but for which appellate decisions have been quite inconsistent throughout 
the country.51 For instance, as noted in greater depth in another study, in recent 
years some appellate courts have considered these statements as relevant evidence 
at sentencing in order to understand the harm suffered by victims and can, thus, be 
considered as aggravating and mitigating factors at sentencing.52 However, other 
appellate courts have considered the statement’s function as purely expressive 
rather than instrumental to the determination of sentence and have stressed that the 
statements cannot be used to influence the sentence.  Indeed, as emphasized by the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal in R. v. W.M., the statements were “not tendered 
for their factual truth; they are expressions of the emotional impact and the other 
effects these offenses had on the complainants, and as such, the appellant’s 
disagreement with some of their contents does not raise any reviewable issue on 
appeal.”53  Further, in stark contrast to the decision in Cook54 by the Appellate 
Court of Quebec, which unequivocally recognized that the content of a VIS—and 
more specifically the harm suffered by the family—can be considered an 
aggravating factor at sentencing, the Alberta Court of Appeal in Karim55 
                                                                                                                                          
48  See JULIAN V. ROBERTS & ALLEN EDGAR, DEP’T OF JUSTICE CAN., VICTIM IMPACT 
STATEMENTS AT SENTENCING: JUDICIAL EXPERIENCES AND PERCEPTIONS: A SURVEY OF THREE 
JURISDICTIONS (2006).  Research suggests that judges have found the information contained in VIS’s 
particularly useful in assessing the harm suffered by the victim.  This has enabled, in turn, a clearer 
assessment of the gravity of the offense, which has contributed to a more adequate respect for the 
principle of proportionality.  
49  Id. at 3. 
50  The vague language used in these provisions in Canada is typical of statutory regimes 
elsewhere, perhaps reflecting an underlying ambivalence towards the role of the victim within the 
adversarial model of justice.  See Julian V. Roberts & Edna Erez, Communication at Sentencing: The 
Expressive Function of Victim Impact Statements, in HEARING THE VICTIM: ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE, 
CRIME VICTIMS AND THE STATE 232, 232 (Anthony Bottoms & Julian V. Roberts eds., 2010). 
51  Marie Manikis, Victim Impact Statements at Sentencing: Towards a Clearer Understanding 
of their Aims, 65 U. TORONTO L.J. 85 (2015). 
52  A similar purpose of VIS has been recognized in most American jurisdictions.  For further 
analysis, see Paul G. Cassell & Edna Erez, Victim Impact Statements and Ancillary Harm: The 
American Perspective, 15 CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 149 (2011). 
53  R. v. W.M., 2010 BCCA 370, para 16 (Can.). 
54  R. c. Cook, 2009 QCCA 2423 (Can.). 
55  R. v. Karim, 2014 ABCA 88 (Can.). 
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highlighted that it is a legal error to treat the family’s loss as an aggravating factor.  
The possibility of cross-examining victims based on their statement also remains 
unclear.  While the Appellate Court of Ontario has recognized that the right to 
cross-examine victims is not automatic and open-ended,56 the Appellate Court of 
British Columbia in R. v. W.M. did not think that cross-examination was relevant 
since VIS are only used as instruments to facilitate expression rather than influence 
the quantum of a sentence.57 
To respond to these tensions and inconsistencies within appellate 
jurisprudence, clearer aims and parameters need to be articulated.  Legislation and 
guidelines can be one way forward.  In a recent piece, a model based on empirical 
findings has been developed which proposes parameters that can serve both 
instrumental and expressive purposes.58  This model suggests that because the 
instrumental purpose can have a direct effect on the sentence, more detailed 
parameters would need to be developed to ensure fairness for all parties.59  For 
instance, the piece outlines that in a model where instrumental aims are present, a 
mechanism would need to be developed to ensure the reliability of these 
statements.60  In addition, if some expressive aims are to be retained along with 
instrumental ones, the definition of relevance might need to include information 
that was traditionally not considered relevant, but which may be considered 
relevant for victim healing.  
The VBR would have been a good opportunity for the legislature to clarify the 
aims behind this regime and to develop or reflect upon adequate parameters that 
would be useful in advancing those aims.  It would appear, however, that such an 
initiative will not be taking place any time soon, since instead of clarifying the 
VIS’s use and aims, the VBR raises more questions than answers.61  For instance, 
the VBR leaves unchanged section 722(1) of the Criminal Code that states that a 
VIS needs to be considered by the court during the determination of the sentence.62  
This can indeed suggest that, like some appellate courts have recognized, the 
statements may occupy an instrumental function in determining the sentence—but 
this remains unclear.  Further, if instrumental aims are to be retained, the ways, if 
any, that the reliability of the statement can be assessed and contested need to be 
specified, but these too are currently lacking.  Indeed, few victims who submit a 
victim impact statement are warned by prosecutors that cross-examination is a 
possibility63 and this possibility is not mentioned anywhere in the new VBR. 
                                                                                                                                          
56  R. v. V.W., 2008 ONCA 55 (Can.). 
57  R. v. W.M., 2010 BCCA 370, para. 16 (Can.) 
58  Manikis, supra note 51.. 
59  Manikis, supra note 51. 
60  Manikis, supra note 51. 
61  For further discussion on this issue see Manikis, supra note 51, at 116.  
62  Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, s 722 (Can.). 
63  See Manikis, supra note 51. 
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B. Refining the Relationship Between Victims and Prosecutors 
 
Another interesting development that is virtually unexplored in Canada is the 
relationship between victims and prosecutors.  The extent of this relationship 
varies between jurisdictions.  For instance, in Canada, prosecutors are meant to 
inform victims about the opportunity to provide a VIS, but their relationship does 
not extend beyond this.64 In England and Wales, prosecutors have extensive 
informational duties towards victims that extend to the different stages of the 
process and have gone beyond mere notification by recognizing prosecutorial 
duties to confer with victims and explain to them why they have made certain 
prosecutorial decisions.65 Similarly, in the United States, prosecutorial duties to 
consult victims upon making determinant decisions have been recognized.  For 
instance, courts have specified that the victims’ right to confer with the prosecutor 
is not to second-guess or veto prosecutorial decisions but rather to allow victims to 
“obtain information from the government, and to form and express their views to 
the government and court.”66 More specifically, in a case involving a plea 
negotiation, the court found that the victim’s right to confer with the prosecutor 
extends to conferring with prosecutors prior to reaching a plea agreement.67 
When compared to these jurisdictions, Canada’s prosecutorial function 
remains quite insulated and requires less communication with victims.  Should 
prosecutors have more duties to interact with victims?  In common law 
jurisdictions, prosecutors are considered ministers of justice and are meant to 
represent the public interest as well as the community, rather than individual 
parties or victims.  They are meant to make their decisions independently without 
any external pressures.  However, since victims are part of the community, it 
would seem legitimate and aligned with the prosecutorial function to include 
                                                                                                                                          
64  For instance, section 722.2(1) of the Criminal Code highlights that before imposing a 
sentence, “the court shall inquire of the prosecutor or a victim . . . whether the victim . . . [has] been 
advised of the opportunity to prepare a [VIS].” R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, s 722 (Can.).  This places a duty 
upon prosecutors to notify victims about this possibility. 
65  See CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE, THE CODE FOR CROWN PROSECUTORS (2013), 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/code_2013_accessible_english.pdf.  Further, prosecutors 
need to notify victims and explain their choices in a number of cases. See CROWN PROSECUTION 
SERVICE, THE CODE OF PRACTICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME: CPS LEGAL GUIDANCE (2013), 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/v_to_z/code_of_practice_for_the_victims_crime_%28victim_s_code%2
9_-_legal_guidance/. 
66  See United States v. BP Products N. Am. Inc., 610 F.Supp. 2d 655, 727 (S.D. Tex. 2009). 
Similarly, in United States v. Heaton, 458 F.Supp. 2d 1271 (D. Utah 2006), the court stated that 
victims should be consulted by the prosecutor prior to a request dismissing the charges.  See also 
United States v. Ingrassia, No. CR-04-0455ADSJO, 2005 WL 2875220 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2005). 
67  In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2008).  For an analysis of victims' rights during 
plea negotiations and possibilities for reform in the Canadian context, see Marie Manikis, 
Recognizing Victims' Role and Rights During Plea Bargaining: A Fair Deal for Victims of Crime, 58 
CRIM. L.Q. 411 (2012). 
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victims’ interests, along with other interests, as relevant elements to consider in the 
exercise of an independent prosecutorial function.  Hence, it would seem that the 
development of prosecutorial interactions with victims would not be antithetical to 
their function and would not affect their objectivity.  Conferring with victims in 
the context of these decisions and processes does not amount to providing victims 
a veto over prosecutorial decision-making or transforming the role of prosecutors 
into victim representatives.  Instead, just like VIS’s have been helpful for judges in 
the execution of their independent sentencing duties, victim input in prosecutorial 
decision-making could arguably be helpful for prosecutorial understanding of the 
harm suffered by victims.  Further, a more discursive relationship between 
prosecutors and victims can go a long way in helping victims understand the 
rationales behind crucial decisions, as well as their limited role within the criminal 
justice process.68  Having to explain some of their decisions to victims would 
indeed add a layer of self-reflection and transparency to the decision-making 
process as well as increase confidence in an agency that traditionally has shared 
little information with victims and the public. 
The system in England and Wales has taken one step further and has recently 
recognized that victims can also play a crucial role in ensuring that prosecutorial 
decisions are not only explained but are also revised in cases of error.  Indeed, in 
2011, the Court of Appeal in Killick69 recognized the right of a victim to seek a 
review of a Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) decision not to prosecute.  In light of 
this judgment, the CPS launched guidelines for the Victims’ Rights to Review 
Scheme, which makes it easier for victims to seek a review of a CPS decision not 
to bring charges or to terminate all proceedings.  In this respect, victims not only 
have a right to judicially review these decisions, but can also review them 
independently in a more accessible administrative process explained in greater 
depth elsewhere.70  One may wonder whether this possibility to review should be 
recognized or even expanded to all prosecutorial decisions, but due to space and 
time constraints, this question will be left for another day.  
As highlighted above, the relationship between victims and prosecutors in the 
Canadian context is very limited and can be explained by the fact that prosecutorial 
discretion remains one of the least transparent and unfettered powers in Canadian 
criminal law.  This power enables prosecutors to make a number of decisions about 
the course of proceedings without offering any explanations or being second-
guessed or reviewed by any other body, unless abuse of process can be 
demonstrated.71  The standard of review required in such cases is very high and has 
                                                                                                                                          
68  See, e.g., JONATHAN DOAK, VICTIMS’ RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
RECONCEIVING THE ROLE OF THIRD PARTIES (2008). 
69  R. v Killick, [2011] EWCA (Crim) 1608 (U.K.). 
70  THE CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE, VICTIMS’ RIGHT TO REVIEW SCHEME (2014), 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/victims_witnesses/victims_right_to_review/. 
71  See Boucher v. The Queen, [1955] S.C.R. 16, 23 (Can.).  More recently, in R. v. Anderson, 
2014 SCC 41 para. 41 (Can.), the Supreme Court of Canada recognized two forms of prosecutorial 
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only been met in a minority of cases.72 Recent decisions have reaffirmed this 
quasi-absolute power and have also found that prosecutors, contrary to judges, do 
not have a constitutional obligation to apply the principle of proportionality when 
making decisions that affect sentencing.73 The Supreme Court of Canada found 
that the role of prosecutors is substantially different than the role of judges, 
highlighting that the prosecutorial function does not include sentencing.  One may 
wonder whether this is a realistic depiction of the role of prosecutors, particularly 
in light of the numerous ways that prosecutors can influence the sentence.  This 
includes the process of plea bargaining and the ability to craft joint submissions 
that are very rarely reviewed by courts.  This method of case resolution, for which 
the judiciary holds great deference, transfers important sentencing powers to 
prosecutors, particularly in the context of the ever-increasing popularity of 
mandatory minimum sentences in Canada.74  
The VBR does not include any changes to the current relationship between 
victims and prosecutors.  In this respect, additional research that encourages 
critical reflections about the role of prosecutors, accountability, and community 
involvement in criminal justice would be welcome first steps to possible changes 
that may contribute to greater victim inclusion in the context of prosecutorial 
decision-making.  
 
C. Implementation and Consequences for Non-Compliance 
 
Another developing theme in the area of victims’ rights is the notion of 
accountability for victims’ rights violations.  In other words, should there be 
                                                                                                                                          
powers, namely exercises of prosecutorial discretion and tactics/conduct before the court.  
Prosecutorial discretion, formerly known as the prosecutor’s core discretion, includes a number of 
influential decisions, including the decisions to prosecute a charge laid by the police, enter a stay of 
proceedings in private and public prosecutions, accept a guilty plea to a lesser charge, withdraw from 
criminal proceedings altogether, and take control of a private prosecution.  This also includes the 
decisions to enter into and repudiate plea agreements as seen in R. v. Nixon, 2011 SCC 34 (Can.), 
and can only be reviewed in exceptional circumstances where there is abuse of process.  The abuse of 
process doctrine is available where there is evidence that the prosecutor’s conduct is egregious and 
seriously compromises trial fairness or the integrity of the justice system.  The burden of proof lies on 
the accused to establish, on a balance of probabilities, a proper evidentiary foundation to proceed 
with an abuse of process claim, before requiring the Crown to provide reasons justifying its decision.  
Hence, where a claimant establishes a proper evidentiary foundation for an abuse of process claim, 
the evidentiary burden may shift to the Crown, who will be obliged to provide explanations for its 
decision. 
72  See, e.g., Krieger v. Law Society of Alberta, 2002 SCC 65 (Can.); R. v. Nixon, 2011 SCC 
34 (Can.); R. v. Power, [1994] S.C.R. 601 (Can.). These cases include situations where there has been 
a “flagrant impropriety”—the prosecutor acted “dishonestly”, in “bad faith”, for an “improper 
purpose,” or with a lack of “objectivity”—or the misconduct amounted to an “abuse of process.” 
73  R. v. Anderson, 2014 SCC 41 (Can.). 
74  This transfer of power has been clearly explained in Palma Paciocco, Proportionality, 
Discretion, and the Roles of Judges and Prosecutors at Sentencing, 18 CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 241 
(2014).  
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mechanisms to monitor the implementation of duties attributed to agencies?  If so, 
should there be consequences for non-compliance? 
 
1. The Legal Unenforceability of Victims’ ‘Rights’ in Canada 
 
All provincial victims' rights statutes are legally unenforceable, expressly 
stipulating that no cause of action or remedy can be received for the failure to 
comply with the specific victims’ act.75 Victims are left without redress and cannot 
claim damages or even seek declaratory relief if the statutory provisions are not 
respected by the agencies that are meant to implement them.  Further, provisions 
found in these statutes state that no right of appeal can arise from the failure to 
comply with the statutes; some even go so far as to provide that proceedings 
cannot be delayed because of non-compliance.  In comparison to actual 
constitutional rights, “[v]ictims’ bills of rights were enacted, but paled in 
comparison to enforceable Charter rights.”76 
The legal unenforceability of victims’ rights was confirmed in the case of 
Vanscoy.77 In this case, victims in Ontario who were not notified of pending court 
dates or consulted with respect to plea bargaining agreements tried to argue in 
court that their statutory rights under the Ontario Victims’ Bill of Rights had been 
breached.78  They also argued that section 2(5), which prohibited a new cause of 
action, appeal, or remedies, violated section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms.79 The victims argued that principles of fundamental justice require 
that there be no right without a remedy and thus the Bills of Rights contravened 
this fundamental principle.80  Finally, they suggested that the right to be kept 
informed had crystallized into a principle of fundamental justice.81  The Superior 
Court, however, decided to dismiss the application and stated that the Ontario 
Victims’ Bill of Rights was not intended to, and did not, provide rights to victims of 
crime.82  The Court concluded that “… the Act is a statement of principle and 
social policy, beguilingly clothed in the language of legislation…even if there were 
                                                                                                                                          
75  See, e.g., Victims of Crime Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c 478, s 10 (Can.) (“no cause of action, 
right of appeal, claim for damages or other remedy in law exists because of this Act or anything done 
or omitted to be done under this Act”). A quasi-identical provision is provided in: Victims of Crime 
Act, R.S.A. 2000, c V-3, s 18 (Can.); Victims of Crime Act, S.S. 1995, c V-6.011, s 18 (Can.); 
Victims of Crime Services Act, R.S.N. 1990, c V-5, s 13 (Can.); Victims of Crime Act, S.P.E.I. 1988 
c 67, s 34 (Can.); Victims’ Rights and Services Act, S.N.S. 1989, c 14, s 13 (Can.); Victims of Crime 
Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c 9 (Supp.), s 18 (Can.). 
76  ROACH, DUE PROCESS AND VICTIMS’ RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 309. 
77  Vanscoy v. Ontario [1999] O.J. No. 1661, 42 WCB (2d) 358 (Can. Ont. S.C.) (QL).  
78  Id. at para. 4–10, 14. 
79  Id. at para. 15. 
80  Id. 
81  Id. 
82  Id. at para. 17–37. 
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indefensible breach of these principles, the legislation expressly precludes any 
remedy for the alleged wrong.”83 There have not been any similar challenges in 
other provinces but courts would presumably reach similar findings if they were 
presented with such cases.  Today, these provincial statutory recognitions are not 
considered rights but merely principles of good practice that agencies should 
respect.  They therefore cannot be considered mandatory even if mandatory 
terminology is used.  
Similarly, victims appealed a decision in which the sentencing judge failed to 
consider a VIS despite the statutory obligation under section 722 of the Criminal 
Code to do so.  In Tellier,84 the judge highlighted that a lack of enforcement of 
section 722 should normally be considered evidence that the judge disregarded an 
important element in sentencing.  Indeed, section 722 requires judges to consider 
any statement prepared for the purposes of determining the sentence to be imposed 
in order to meet certain sentencing objectives, including providing reparations for 
and acknowledgment of harm done to victims.85  Despite this acknowledgement, 
the judge stated that  
 
[h]owever, given the unexceptional nature of these offences, we are 
satisfied that this experienced judge would have known full well the 
frightening impact such offences can have.  We note as well, that in her 
submissions at the time of sentencing, counsel for the Crown referred to 
the “terrifying situation” the clerks would have faced.  In the absence of 
submissions, we do not find it necessary to comment further on this 
ground of appeal.86 
 
In this respect, a statutory duty was breached yet no remedy was offered 
based on the assumption that the trial judge was experienced and would not need 
any victim impact statements to fully understand the impact of the offense in 
question.  This decision undermines the rule of law and the legislative function by 
justifying this kind of violation in cases where the nature of the harm seems 
unexceptional. 
 
2. The Importance of Recognizing Consequences to Non-Compliance 
 
i. For Victims 
 
Despite this unenforceability, certain statutes use the terminology of ‘rights’ 
to designate these principles, inevitably creating false hopes and expectations for 
                                                                                                                                          
83  Id. at para. 22, 41. 
84  R. v. Tellier, 2000 ABCA 219, para. 15–16 (Can. Alta.). 
85  Id. 
86  Id. at para. 16. 
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victims of crime.87  For instance, the discourse of rights has been present in several 
statutes and includes the right to receive information, the right to make a statement 
about the effects of the crime, the right to be treated with respect and sensitivity in 
court, and the right to emotional and practical support.  One may argue that these 
schemes are misleading because they convey the impression of a commitment to 
victims’ rights without clearly specifying what they really are and indeed without 
providing any legal standing or redress when these ‘rights’ have been breached or 
ignored. 
Additionally, the creation of false hopes and expectations coupled with the 
absence of a redress mechanism to respond to breaches likely create a form of 
secondary victimization.  Arguably, a form of victimization may result from the 
process’s failure to respond adequately to victims’ complaints when agencies have 
already failed to fulfill their initial duty.  Additional research in this area would be 
useful to assess the real impact of such false expectations and the extent of 
secondary victimization.  
 
ii. For Criminal Justice Agencies 
 
Recognizing consequences to non-compliance can promote accountability and 
facilitate implementation.  Some commentators argue that obligations placed on 
criminal justice agencies are unlikely to be taken seriously unless consequences are 
attached to non-compliance.88 Accordingly, Shapland states that if one wants 
change, consequences must be recognized in cases where agencies do not 
comply.89 Doak also argues that “[w]ithout a form of justiciable redress, methods 
used to ensure that victims are able to rely on ‘rights’ created in Government 
publications are ultimately meaningless.”90  Similarly, Ashworth and Redmayne 
have stated that institutionalized systems of accountability can provide a way to 
ensure that the various authorities fulfill their functions, duties, and powers as they 
should.91  
Despite the importance of developing an accessible mechanism of 
accountability and redress for victims of crime, there are currently no legal 
                                                                                                                                          
87  Victims’ Rights and Services Act, S.N.S. 1989, c 14, s 3(2)(a) (Can.); An Act Respecting 
Assistance for Victims of Crime, C.Q.L.R. c A-13.2, s 4 (Can.); The Victims’ Bill of Rights, 
C.C.S.M., c V55 (Can.); JOAN BARRETT, BALANCING CHARTER INTERESTS, VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AND 
THIRD PARTY REMEDIES (2000). 
88  John D. Jackson, Justice for All: Putting Victims at the Heart of the Criminal Justice?, 30 
J.L. SOC’Y 309, 319 (2003); Marie Manikis, Recognizing Victims’ Role and Rights During Plea 
Bargaining: A Fair Deal for Victims of Crime, 58 CRIM. L.Q. 411 (2012). 
89  Joanna Shapland, Bringing Victims in from the Cold: Victims’ Role in Criminal Justice, in 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, CONFERENCE REPORT, 13 (J. Jackson & K. 
Quinn, eds., 2003). 
90  DOAK, supra note 68, at 246.  
91  ASHWORTH & REDMAYNE, supra note 3. 
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consequences for not providing information to victims and most provinces do not 
even provide non-legal consequences to breaches. 
Some limited victims’ initiatives in Canada recognize that victims should be 
informed of their available options when duties have been breached, and have 
enacted an administrative mechanism of accountability.92 For instance, in British 
Columbia, the provincial statute states that the Ombudsperson Act is applicable and 
provides a complaint mechanism to victims in cases of breaches.93  According to 
this Act, the Ombudsperson has important investigative powers that include the 
inspection of premises, the summons of individuals on oath, and the request of any 
documents.94 Further, it has broad recommendation powers towards the authority 
under investigation and can eventually submit a report to the Lieutenant Governor 
in Council and the Legislative Assembly if its recommendations are ignored.95 
Prosecutorial discretion remains unaffected since the statute clearly states that the 
Ombudsman does not have jurisdiction to investigate the appropriateness of these 
decisions.96  
Similarly, in Manitoba, the Victims’ Bill of Rights provides for a formal 
complaint process to the Director of Victim Support Services, who must make a 
report after investigating the matter.97 In case of dissatisfaction with respect to the 
Director’s investigation or report, the victim can make a complaint to the 
Ombudsman according to the Ombudsman Act.98 This Act provides the 
Ombudsman with important investigatory powers99 and the ability to recommend a 
wide range of measures to the appropriate minister, and to the department or 
agency of the government concerned, in order to rectify the breach or decision 
made.100 Due to space constraints, however, the efficacy of these provincial 
ombudsmen cannot be analyzed in this article, but further research in this area is 
needed to determine whether they can effectively respond to victims’ rights 
violations and agency non-compliance. 
                                                                                                                                          
92  DEP’T OF JUSTICE CAN., supra note 9; Victims of Crime Act, R.S.S. 1995, c V-6.011, s 2.1(j) 
(Can.). Further, Alberta’s Victims of Crime Act, R.S.A. 2000, c V-3, s 3(2)(b) (Can.), suggests that 
victims can bring their concerns to the Director who is an employee under the government, but it 
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Additionally, different models of accountability and redress exist in other 
common law jurisdictions.  Considering the limited developments in Canada, these 
different models are worth studying and reflecting upon with regard to issues of 
implementation and adequate enforceability in Canada.  For instance, the Code of 
Practice for Victims of Crime in England and Wales provides victims with a 
complaints procedure to the Parliamentary Ombudsman.  In this process, victims 
have to address their complaints related to non-compliance internally to the agency 
in breach and eventually to a Parliamentary Ombudsman through a Member of 
Parliament.101  An evaluation of this process has been completed and has found 
that some of its structures, namely the requirement to address these complaints to 
an MP, render the process inaccessible for victims.  This research has also shown 
that for certain types of recognized victims’ rights, ombudsmen are well placed to 
provide useful and adequate redress for victims’ rights violations.102 For instance, 
for breaches related to the provision of information by criminal justice agencies, 
victims were provided a combination of remedies, ranging from apologies to 
redress payments going up to £5,000 (approximately US $8,000). 
Further, in the United States—as with most criminal justice matters—there is 
a great deal of variation across states, but some states, and the U.S. Congress, have 
recognized enforceable court-based mechanisms for victims to address breaches 
and obtain remedies.  The current paper does not aim to evaluate the range of 
sophisticated remedial schemes, as this will be left for another day and has partly 
been examined in other research;103 however it is worth briefly discussing some 
developments related to these initiatives in America with a main focus on 
compliance by agencies and the remedial consequences on defendants’ rights.  
Some American statutes provide victims with legal standing104 or 
representation by a prosecutor105 or another official106 to file motions before the 
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criminal trial court to assert the victims’ rights.  In other states, courts outside the 
criminal process can provide enforcement options to victims.  For instance, in 
some states, an administrative court can provide a writ of mandamus directing an 
agency to comply with the law.107 At the federal level, the Crime Victims’ Rights 
Act (CVRA)108 enables victims to enforce their rights by filing a motion in the trial 
court as well as mandamus action before the appellate court to enforce compliance. 
An empirical comparative study of some of these mechanisms found that 
generally, victims were more likely to be provided their rights in the states with 
strong statutory and state constitutional protection of victims’ rights than the ones 
where no such protection is provided.109 Further, it is important to note that the 
legal enforcement of victims’ rights has enabled courts to provide victims with 
creative remedies when their rights have been breached.110 Despite these important 
developments for victims of crime, some courts have ordered remedies that have 
been criticized for having a considerable impact on the finality of the process as 
well as the accused’s rights.  For instance, to remedy the failure of state officials to 
notify the victim of the hearing scheduled for an offender’s release on parole, the 
Arizona Court of Appeals set aside the offender’s release order on parole and 
directed a new hearing.111  
It is worth reflecting on types of remedies that may be the best compromise 
between providing some redress for violations and not impacting the defendant’s 
rights in the process.  There may be room to imagine remedies that would directly 
target the agency in breach rather than the process itself in order to avoid 
disrupting the process and its finality, and tampering with defendants’ rights.  For 
instance, in Myers v. Daley,112 the Court of Appeals sanctioned a prosecutor who 
was not providing the victim with information about his case by upholding an 
award of costs for the victim, requiring him to take legal action.  A similar remedy 
may have been an alternative option in the Arizona parole case mentioned above. 
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However, it may also be that some types of victims’ rights breaches really 
affect the legitimacy, fairness, and outcome of proceedings and therefore require 
more robust sanctions that can affect the outcome of proceedings.  A comparative 
analysis with other enforcement mechanisms has shown that for certain types of 
rights, legal enforcement mechanisms, such as the one found in the CVRA, have 
enabled some adequate remedy.113  For instance, if we agree that victim impact 
statements are useful to achieve proportionate sentences by providing more 
accurate information related to the level of harm suffered, one may think that a 
process that has not allowed a victim to provide such statement may be flawed, and 
possibly increase the risk of disproportionate sentences.  For these reasons, it may 
be worth re-opening the sentencing hearing and enabling victims to provide a 
statement.114  Similarly, in a case where a victim is not notified of the original 
sentencing hearing date by a prosecutor and consequently was not able to claim 
restitution, it may be adequate to re-hear such proceeding in order to attain a just 
result.115 
Despite some progress in Canada regarding accountability, most provincial 
statutes do not provide any mechanisms to ensure accountability and across 
Canada, as all victims’ bills of rights are legally unenforceable.  Without effective 
legislative reform, agencies in breach of their duties towards victims will remain 
untouchable and victims’ rights will continue to be considered discretionary.  As a 
progressive state that values the rule of law and the importance of robust 
fundamental rights, Canada has yet to show its effective support towards victims of 
crime by providing adequate tools to ensure that their rights are not trampled on 




John Gardner has argued that one of the fundamental roles of the State is to 
facilitate peaceful living among citizens and to safeguard the basic means by which 
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individual citizens can lead good lives.116 When the State breaches its social 
contract by failing to prevent crime, it should respond in ways that minimize any 
chances of additional harm being caused to some of the injured community 
members, including victims of crime.  In this respect, when responding to crime, 
the State has an obligation to ensure that adequate measures are in place to 
minimize any additional harm caused to victims of crime.  This includes providing 
adequate information and explanation about why certain decisions have been 
reached in relation to their case.  To monitor the implementation of these 
obligations, mechanisms should also be put in place to address situations where 
these duties are ignored or only partially implemented. 
Some developments of victims’ rights in the United States, England, and 
Wales are first steps towards State recognition of obligations towards victims of 
crime.  As highlighted above, Canada is still a long way from meeting similar 
developments and providing adequate mechanisms of implementation.  Based on 
the comparative perspectives articulated above, Canada has a number of models 
and empirical findings to rely on for exploring and assessing potential ways 
forward for the development of victim rights and remedies in the criminal justice 
process.  The enactment of Bill C-32 would have been the right moment and forum 
to bring in most of these proposals and address topics that may not have featured in 
this bill, including the relationship between prosecutors and victims as well as 
improving information sharing.  Further, victims as well as criminal justice 
agencies have long waited for some clarity with regard to the victim impact 
statement regime.  The ongoing controversy and inconsistent judgments at the 
appellate level with regard to the role of VIS can finally be addressed and unified, 
but perhaps we may need to wait for further modifications to Bill C-32. 
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